Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 19

Issue 1

Article 4

2018

Assessing Parental Rights for Children with Genetic Material from
Three Parents
Daniel R. Green
University of Minnesota Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel R. Green, Assessing Parental Rights for Children with Genetic Material from Three Parents, 19
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 251 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol19/iss1/4

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Note
Assessing Parental Rights for Children with
Genetic Material from Three Parents
Daniel Green*
INTRODUCTION
A healthy baby boy was born on April 6, 2016.1 Although
seemingly ordinary on the surface, this event represents a
monumental scientific advancement in that this child signifies
the first healthy birth resulting from the genetic material of
three different people through the use of a procedure known as
mitochondrial replacement therapy.2 The family adopted this
© 2018 Daniel R. Green
* JD Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. BA
Psychology & Theater, Saint John’s University. Special thanks to all the editors
and staff at MJLST for their work on Volume 19. Also, thank you to my parents,
James and Karla, for all the support over the years, without whom I would not
be where I am today. Finally, thank you to my brother, David, for being the best
friend and role model I could ever have hoped for.
1. See Jessica Hamzelou, Exclusive: World’s First Baby Born with New “3
Parent” Technique, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.newscientist
.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-new-3-parenttechnique/.
2. See Maggie Fox, Baby Born Using ‘Three Parent’ Technique, Doctors
Say, NBC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016, 9:41 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com
/health/health-news/baby-born-using-three-parent-technique-doctors-sayn655701; see also Daniel Green, Three’s a Crowd: Identifying the Shifting
Parental Rights in Three-Parent Babies, LAWSCI FORUM (Oct. 3, 2016), https://
editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/threes-a-crowd-identifying-the-shifting-parentalrights-in-three-parent-babies/. But see Charlotte Pritchard, The Girl with Three
Biological Parents, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news
/magazine-28986843. Children have been born with the mitochondrial DNA of
a third individual before, but there are specific differences between the
cytoplasmic transfer method used then and mitochondrial replacement therapy
in use currently. Id. In cytoplasmic transfer, donor mitochondrial DNA is
injected into the mother’s egg. See Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent In Vitro
Fertilization: Gene Replacement for the Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial
Diseases, 101 FERTILITY & STERILITY 31, 32 (2014). This donor’s mitochondrial
DNA mixes with the mother’s mitochondrial DNA thereby resulting in both the
mother’s and the donor’s DNA being existent in the egg compared with
mitochondrial replacement therapy where nearly all the mitochondrial DNA in
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procedure to avoid a genetic defect known to cause Leigh
syndrome—a disorder which manifests itself in the
mitochondrial DNA of the mother’s egg and is passed from
mother to child through birth.3 Leigh syndrome can have
disastrous effects on the development of organs, especially the
brain.4 This inherited disease resulted in four previous losses of
pregnancy for the mother and an additional two deaths of her
children after birth: one at the age of six years and one at the
age of eight months.5 In the successful birth, mitochondrial
replacement therapy provided a way to avoid the genetic defect
by making use of DNA from three different individuals—two
women contributed eggs and one man contributed sperm for
fertilization of the egg.6 Aside from being born slightly
premature, the child was born healthy thereby assuaging initial
concerns that the diseased mother’s mitochondrial DNA may
replicate faster than the treatment could correct.7
A team of fertility specialists from the United States of
America and Great Britain completed the treatment in Mexico
since the procedure has not been approved in the United States,
but this may not be the case for long given its success.8 If
approved in the United States, as may likely be the case in the
near future, the use of mitochondrial replacement therapy
possesses the potential to alter how courts determine legal
parentage since such disputes would lead to the first cases over
children who have the genetic material of three separate
the resulting egg is that of the donor. Id. This means that even less of the child’s
DNA is attributed to the mitochondrial donor. Id. Furthermore, this procedure
was halted quickly since several of the resultant children suffered from
abnormalities that may be attributable to the treatment. See Pritchard, supra
note 2.
3. See Fox, supra note 2; see also Green, supra note 2; NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
Leigh Syndrome, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov
/condition/leigh-syndrome (last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
4. See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 3.
5. See Hamzelou, supra note 1.
6. See Fox, supra note 2; Green, supra note 2.
7. Karen Weintraub, “3-Parent Baby” Procedure Faces New Hurdle, SCI.
AM. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ldquo-threeparent-baby-rdquo-procedure-faces-new-hurdle/.
8. See Hamzelou, supra note 1 (stating that such success is likely to
increase progress around the world); see, e.g., Akshat Rathi, The World’s Second
Three-Parent Baby Has Been Conceived Using a Controversial Technique,
QUARTZ (Jan. 18, 2017), https://qz.com/887916/the-worlds-second-three-parentbaby-has-been-conceived-using-a-controversial-pronuclear-transfer-ivftechnique.
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individuals. This treatment could lead to a great number of
disputes given the likelihood of widespread use due to the
frequency of resultant genetic defects from errors in
mitochondrial DNA. Given this concern, the legal community
should proactively recognize and address the challenges
presented by this emerging field as they occur rather than
reactively after such inevitable problems arise.
This Note argues that the legal community should adopt a
strict rule—similar to the approach taken in organ donation—
when resolving disputes of legal parentage involving
mitochondrial replacement therapy. This stance would oppose
the adoption of the common stances currently taken when
assessing parentage in other methods of assisted reproductive
therapy. In espousing the outlook of this Note, courts and
legislatures should adopt a bright line rule which determines
that the individual donating mitochondrial DNA to the resulting
child should have no parental rights. The application of this
default rule should supersede any other determination of legal
parentage made through the application of other approaches.
Part I provides a background, explains the science behind
mitochondrial replacement therapy, and closes with a brief
overview of legal stances taken in organ donation. Part II goes
through the different approaches taken in determining legal
parentage for assisted reproductive technologies, provides
examples in case law, and explains why they should not apply to
mitochondrial replacement therapy. Part II further argues that
the existing approaches taken in assessing legal parentage in
assisted reproductive technologies cannot be transferred to
mitochondrial replacement therapy and suggests a bright line
rule. Lastly, this Note concludes in Part III that the bright line
rule proposed in Part II should be used in evaluating parentage
disputes which involve mitochondrial replacement therapy and
that doing so will reduce the potential for overall uncertainty in
an already inconsistent area of law.
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BACKGROUND

A. THE SCIENCE BEHIND THREE-PARENT BABIES
Mitochondrial replacement therapy (“MRT”) is categorized
as an assisted reproductive technology (“ART”).9 Unfortunately,
any form of ART, when used, creates a grey area in assessing
legal parentage.10 In such disputes, courts have placed emphasis
on the relationships between the possible parent and the child
in reaching a resolution.11 In identifying a child’s parents, courts
have identified three relevant relationships:
(1) An ‘intended parent’ is a parent who intended to bring a child into
the world to raise as his or her own; (2) a ‘genetic parent’ is a person
who shares DNA with the child; and (3) the ‘biological parent’ (also
called the ‘gestational parent’ or ‘birth mother’) is the woman who
gave birth to the child.12

Traditionally, children possess genetic material supplied by
the sperm and egg of two separate individuals at birth.13 This
would mean that the three separate labels would generally apply
to the same two people.14 ART complicates this by separating
such categories.15 However, even in these disputes, ART leads to

9. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; see also Amy B. Leiser, Note,
Parentage Disputes in the Age of Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 104 GEO.
L.J. 413, 414 (2016); CELLULAR, TISSUE, & GENE THERAPIES ADVISORY COMM.,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OOCYTE MODIFICATION IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TRANSMISSION OF MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE OR
TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY 11 (2014) [hereinafter FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT].
10. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
11. Id. at 414–15.
12. Id. at 414–15; see SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2010) (addressing how the concept of motherhood has
changed given the scientific advancements in forms of ART); CHARLES P.
KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYERS GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 2 (2d ed.
2011) (discussing the creation of new parental concepts such as the “‘intended
parent,’ ‘gestational carrier,’ and ‘gamete provider’”).
13. Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for
Lenders of Genetic Material, 92 NEB. L. REV. 799, 812 (2014) (citation omitted)
(“Notwithstanding the scientific breakthroughs in reproductive technology and
the more inclusive modern understanding of the family unit, every child begins
with two (and only two) suppliers of genetic material and one (and only one)
gestational carrier.”).
14. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 415–16.
15. Id.
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a child that is born with genetic material from only two other
people.16
MRT, on the other hand, leads to children born with genetic
material from three different individuals (these children are
commonly referred to as “three-parent babies”).17 This technique
divides the label of the genetic parent even further than
traditional forms of ART in that a single child conceived by MRT
may have two legitimate “genetic mothers.”18 This situation
results because MRT works by manipulating egg cells prior to
fertilization.19 Egg cells consist of “nuclei with nuclear DNA—
the ‘instruction manual’ for the cell—and many intracellular
organelles that carry on the functions of our cells—the
‘machinery’ of the cell.”20 Mitochondria are one such organelle
and are comprised of mitochondrial DNA.21 MRT, then, is a
process which removes the nucleus from one egg and transfers
the nucleus into the remnants of a different donated egg (which
previously had its nucleus removed and discarded).22 The
resultant egg has a nucleus from one individual (the “nuclear
mother”) and mitochondrial DNA from a donor (the
“mitochondrial mother”).23 The father’s sperm then fertilizes the
newly assembled egg, and it is implanted in the nuclear mother
in order to begin the pregnancy.24 Because of this process, the
resultant child possesses DNA from the father, the nuclear
mother, and the mitochondrial mother.25 However, a comparison
of the amount of DNA in a child’s cell reveals that the cells

16. Id.
17. Id. at 414.
18. See generally id. at 416 (stating that MRT challenges traditional views
“because children born from MRT have DNA from three different people”).
19. There is another variation of conducting MRT involving embryos rather
than eggs discussed later, but the process shares the same ultimate result that
a child will be born with DNA from three individuals. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 9.
20. Leiser, supra note 9, at 414 (citing NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www
.genome.gov/25520880 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); NAT’L INST. HEALTH, What
Is a Cell?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook
/basics/cell (last visited Nov. 28, 2016)).
21. Leiser, supra note 9, at 414 (citing FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra
note 9, at 5).
22. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
23. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
24. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
25. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
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consist of less than 0.001% of mitochondrial DNA thereby
making up only 0.1%–0.2% of a person’s genes.26
Despite the fact that mitochondrial DNA takes up such a
small percentage of overall DNA and seemingly has no link to a
child’s appearance or personality, it is vastly important.27
Defects in mitochondrial DNA have the potential to create
extremely detrimental genetic diseases that are passed down
from mother to child.28 Mitochondrial DNA mutations can cause
diseases and defects in many vital organs including the brain,
liver, heart, and kidneys, they can affect muscles and the central
nervous system, and they “may contribute to the development of
common multifactorial disorders such as diabetes mellitus and
neurodegenerative disease.”29 Further, mitochondrial DNA in
women’s eggs also tend to deteriorate as they age thereby
increasing risks of disorders developing in both the pregnancy
and the resulting child.30 MRT may have the ability to combat

26. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 417 n.17 (citing Robert W. Taylor & Doug
M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA Mutations in Human Disease, 6 NATURE
REVS. GENETICS 389, 391 (2005)) (“MtDNA contains less than 17,000 base pairs
and only 37 genes, whereas nuclear DNA contains about 3.3 billion base pairs
and 20,000–30,000 genes. But see Garry Hamilton, The Hidden Risks for ‘ThreePerson’ Babies, 525 NATURE 444, 445 (2015) (‘Roughly 1,500 nuclear genes are
involved in mitochondrial function, including around 76 that encode proteins
which bind to mitochondrially derived peptides.’).”).
27. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31; Leiser, supra note 9, at 417–18. Sperm
also contribute mitochondria to the resultant embryo, but they are destroyed
soon after fertilization. See Peter Sutovsky et al., Ubiquitin Tag for Sperm
Mitochondria, 402 NATURE 371, 371–72 (1999).
28. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31 (stating that defects in mitochondrial
DNA can result in severe chronic diseases).
29. Leiser, supra note 9, at 418; see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31; see
also Andrew M. Schaefer et al., The Epidemiology of Mitochondrial Disorders—
Past, Present and Future, 1659 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA 115, 115
(2004); Robert W. Taylor & Doug M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA Mutations
in Human Disease, 6 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 389, 394 (2005).
30. See Timothy Wai et al., The Role of Mitochondrial DNA Copy Number
in Mammalian Fertility, 83 BIOLOGY OF REPROD. 52, 53 (2010); Li-ya Wang et
al., Mitochondrial Functions on Oocytes and Preimplantation Embryos, 10 J.
ZHEJIANG U. SCI. B, 483, 486 (2009) (“Natural human fertility decreases with
the maternal age . . . .”); see also Leiser, supra note 9, at 418 (citations omitted)
(“Age-related female infertility is also suspected to be associated with reduced
quantity and mutation of mitochondria women’s eggs. Egg quality is negatively
correlated with maternal age and mitochondrial DNA damage. Therefore, few,
low-quality mitochondria in a woman’s eggs could contribute to age-related
infertility.”). But see FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 9, at 11 (“The
quality and quantity of mitochondria in the oocyte might contribute to the
developmental competence of the embryo, and mitochondrial factors might be
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these as well as other fertility issues in women who wish to
conceive at an older age, struggle to conceive at a younger one,
or even in such situations where it would normally be considered
dangerous for well-being of the mother and the potential child to
attempt a pregnancy.31 As seen in the aforementioned success
story, MRT is utilized as a treatment to prevent these genetic
diseases.32
There are currently two scientific approaches that could
consistently lead to successful MRT procedures: spindle transfer
and pronuclear transfer.33 There was also a previous
experimental method attempted in the late 1990’s that injected
healthy mitochondrial DNA into eggs that may have carried
flawed mitochondrial DNA, but this research was soon halted by
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).34 The FDA blocked

linked to infertility and reproductive aging. However, there is no consensus on
the extent that female infertility can be attributed to oocyte and embryo
mitochondrial insufficiency.”).
31. See FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 9, at 11 (stating abnormal
mitochondria in the oocyte could be related to infertility and that these various
methods might also improve in vitro fertilization (IVF) outcomes for infertile
women); Leiser, supra note 9, at 420.
32. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Hamzelou, supra note 1; Leiser,
supra note 9, at 420.
33. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–34. Interestingly, it appears that
both techniques of producing children are successful as seen in the two case
studies, cited earlier in this Note. Compare Rathi, supra note 8, with Hamzelou,
supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (stating that research and
experimentation on a nonviable living human fetus ex utero or a living human
fetus ex utero for whom viability has not been ascertained may not be conducted
unless it may enhance the well-being of the fetus or it will pose no added risk of
suffering, injury, or death to the fetus); see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35.
Although no federal law bans human embryo research in the United
States, there are restrictions on funding. . . . [T]he Dickey-Wicker
amendment, prohibits the creation of human embryos for research
purposes or research in which a human embryo is harmed or
destroyed. Several states, such as California and New York, provide
funding support for embryonic stem cell research. However, some
states, such as California, ban compensation of oocyte donors for
research.
Id. at 35; Gina Kolata, Birth of Baby with Three Parents’ DNA Marks Success
for Banned Technique, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/09/28/health/birth-of-3-parent-baby-a-success-for-controversialprocedure.html (“More than a decade ago — before controversy forced the work
to stop — researchers tried a simpler technique that did not involve swapping
nuclei between eggs. Instead, they injected some healthy mitochondria into an
egg in an attempt to help with repeated failures at in vitro fertilization. It was
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this third form of research by passing regulations requiring FDA
approval for such research through an application process.35
Congress then followed the FDA’s actions with legislation,
premised on ethical concerns for the safety of the children
potentially resulting from third method, which made it
impossible for such research to be funded.36
The FDA has not yet approved either spindle or pronuclear
transfer, but this may soon change given the recent success
stories surrounding MRT.37 It is likely that the FDA will favor
spindle transfer over pronuclear transfer due to the existence of
certain ethical concerns.38 Pronuclear transfer requires the
destruction of embryos since the removal of the nucleus takes
place after fertilization of the egg, whereas, in spindle transfer,
the removal of the nucleus occurs prior to fertilization.39 Thus,
pronuclear transfer requires the destruction of an embryo while
spindle transfer does not.40 Spindle transfer may open a door for
the FDA to follow actions taken in other countries, such as the
United Kingdom,41 and allow MRT research and treatment to

not a method that could be used to prevent the birth of children with
mitochondrial diseases.”).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2); see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 34–35
(stating that in vitro research using human embryos is controversial; however,
one advantage of spindle transfer over pronuclear transfer is that the donor
oocytes need not be fertilized, which would avoid the creation and destruction
of embryos for the sole purpose of medical treatment).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2).
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289g; Amato et al., supra note 2, at 34–35; Kolata,
supra note 34. The spindle transfer technique is more thoroughly researched
than the pronuclear transfer technique. Leiser, supra note 9, at 421–22. The
spindle transfer method was successfully used in 2012 to create human embryos
in which all of the mitochondria came from a donor egg. Id. The technique has
also been demonstrated to work with previously frozen eggs. Id. Both
techniques must clear significant regulatory hurdles before either can be
clinically used. Id. The FDA convened in February 2014 to consider the
technology’s safety. Id. Since then, the Institute of Medicine has begun
conducting a series of meetings to discuss related ethical and social policy
issues, and the British Parliament has voted to allow MRT to be used by
specially licensed researchers. Id.
38. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34.
39. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34.
40. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34.
41. Michael Le Page, UK Becomes First Country to Give Go Ahead to ThreeParent Babies, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com
/article/2116407-uk-becomes-first-country-to-give-go-ahead-to-three-parentbabies/ (“[The United Kingdom’s] Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority

2018]

ASSESSING PARENTAL RIGHTS

259

take place in the United States.42 This approach, if approved,
would likely gain strong public support given that, as of now, the
only way to prevent the transmission of a mitochondrial disorder
or disease during pregnancy is through whole egg or embryo
donation.43
B. CURRENT POSSIBILITIES FOR LEGAL PARENTHOOD OF THREEPARENT BABIES
1. Legal Principles of Other Assisted Reproductive
Technologies
In both whole egg donation and embryo donation the
resulting child possesses genetic material from only two people
as opposed to the three that results from MRT.44 Whole egg
donation requires an egg donor, similar to the need for an egg
donor in MRT, except that no transfer takes place between the
birth mother’s45 egg and the egg provided by the donor.46 After
the egg donation, the father’s sperm then fertilizes the donated
egg, and the resultant embryo is implanted into the birth
mother.47 The child that results then has genetic material of only
the father and the egg donor since the mere implantation of an
egg in an individual does not add any genetic material to the
embryo.48
In embryo donation, both egg and sperm donors are
recruited for the process and the resultant embryo is, again,
implanted in the birth mother.49 The child that follows has
genetic material of only the egg and sperm donors.50 Meaning

has given a cautious go-ahead to the use of mitochondrial replacement therapy
to prevent mitochondrial disorders, which can be fatal.”).
42. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34.
43. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Leiser, supra note 9, at 421.
44. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 12, at 105–07; Leiser, supra
note 9, at 418 (“With whole egg donation, the intending parents use only an egg
donor, whereas with embryo donation, the intending parents use both an egg
donor and a sperm donor.”).
45. Use of the label of birth mother in this instance assumes that surrogacy
is not employed.
46. Leiser, supra note 9, at 418.
47. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 12, at 105.
48. Id. at 107.
49. Id. The label of birth mother, again, assumes that surrogacy is not
employed.
50. Id.
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that the possibility exists that—if both egg and sperm donors are
employed for a single couple—the resulting parents may not
share any genetic material with the child.51 In contrast, the
purpose of MRT is to employ only mitochondrial DNA—rather
than the entire DNA—from a donor, and an intervening
scientific event—MRT—takes place.52 Despite the distinct
differences between these two techniques, it has been proposed
that the way the law treats these forms of ART may provide
valuable inferences as to how parental rights should be assigned
in cases of MRT.53
As for ART, it may be suggested that there are four common
approaches courts adhere to when resolving disputes where
parentage is at issue: the application of state statutes and public
policy, basing the decision on the best interests of the child,
assigning parentage based on genetic relationship to the child,
and assigning parental rights based on the intent of the
potential parents.54 Regardless of what test is relied upon, in
resolving parental disputes in ART, court decisions have
reflected tendencies to reach the same result as if the intent test
had been used, and, because of these similar end results, it has
been argued that the intent test would be the best method to
adhere to due to its consistency and applicability.55 However,
each of these approaches, including the intent test, should not
be applied to parentage disputes involving MRT because the
process and nature of MRT reveals similarities to organ donation
that render traditional ART approaches inapplicable.
2. Legal Principles of Organ Donation
When assessing the most applicable law in parentage
disputes arising from MRT, an understanding of the basic legal

51. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 422.
52. Id. at 420–22 (explaining that MRT transfers the nuclear DNA of the
intending mother into a donor egg with healthy mitochondria, ensuring the
resulting child will also have healthy mitochondria).
53. See generally Leiser, supra note 9, at 422–26.
54. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An Empirical Analysis of the
Use of the Intent Test to Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive
Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013). Although Byrn &
Giddings set for five different approaches, I merge the state statutes and public
policy approaches in this Note because of the interplay that public policy has in
the interpretation of state statutes.
55. Id. at 1324
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principles of organ donation is needed.56 In organ donation, it is
widely accepted that a willing donor loses the property rights in
his or her bodily materials at the point that it becomes fully
integrated in the recipient.57 However, the process becomes
complicated in determining at what point in the procedure “full
integration” occurs for the tissues and organs involved and when
the donor loses all property rights in such materials.58 Given this
grey area, courts have ruled that the medical personnel handling
donated material are accountable to both the recipient’s as well
as the donor’s wishes.59 In order to promote clarity, many courts
have determined that a donor must make his or her wishes
known prior to the abandonment of materials because cells
without a designated use are often considered abandoned when
removed from an individual.60 Courts have held firm to this
conclusion even if value is later given to the removed bodily
materials through sophisticated biotechnological techniques.61
Because the donor in MRT provides, at the time of donation, a
fully functional egg with the understanding that it is to be
altered,62 the conclusions held by these courts provide insight

56. As there exists a great deal of debate in the area of post-mortem
property rights and donation, this Note will simplify the matter by limiting the
comparison of the MRT process with inter vivos donations from consensual
donors.
57. See Bernard M. Dickens, Living Tissue and Organ Donors and Property
Law: More on Moore, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 73, 90 (1992) (citing
Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (“[W]hen a
person does nothing and says nothing to indicate an intent to assert his right of
ownership, possession, or control over such material [as comes from his body],
the only rational inference is that he intends to abandon the material.”))
(explaining when a person makes clear her intention that the material should
be transplanted into a designated recipient, that person asserts a right of
ownership and control until the transplantation takes place, and those who
control property can lawfully direct not only its use but also its return or
deliberate destruction). Thus, “[w]hen couples deposit their gametes for in vitro
fertilization, they intend exclusive use for themselves and possess the legal
power to forbid any other reproductive use.” Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 502
(Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“It is also clear, under traditional
common law principles, that this right of a patient to control the future use of
his organ is protected by the law of conversion.”).
60. See Dickens, supra note 57, at 86–87. See generally Moore, 793 P.2d at
492–93.
61. Dickens, supra note 57, at 86–87.
62. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the process of
MRT).
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and clarification as to how parental rights should be assigned if
a dispute arises over a child conceived through the use of MRT.63
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE INTENT BASED TEST AND WHY IT DOES NOT APPLY TO
MRT
As previously discussed, courts appear to have adopted four
common methods to assess legal parentage in cases of ART.64
Although courts and academics seem to champion the intent
test,65 each test possesses its own unique strengths when applied
to a dispute involving children conceived through ART,66 but
each method fails in its ability to provide a proper solution to
disputes in parentage stemming from MRT.
1. The Application of Existing State Statutes to Matters of
MRT
Certain states have crafted statutes in an attempt to
proactively address the problem surrounding legal parentage of
ART methods.67 As such, these existing statutes have the
potential to extend to MRT matters since MRT is categorized as
a form of ART.68 However, even when applied to legal issues
involving traditional ART, the wording and structure of these
statutes tend to limit their applicability.69 Often statutes tend to
make use of ambiguous and overgeneralized wording which
hinders clear application to matters of ART.70 Ambiguity in
statutes implicitly creates inconsistencies in the application of
the law because it allows for courts to interpret statutes in ways
often contrary to their intended meaning.71 The lack of
consistency, even in the various forms of traditional ART

63. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
64. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301; Leiser supra note 9, at
423.
65. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1324; see also Leiser, supra note
9, at 425–26.
66. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–09.
67. See id. at 1301–02.
68. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 414.
69. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–02; see also Leiser, supra
note 9, at 424.
70. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–02.
71. See id. at 1301–04.
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disputes, suggests that it may be impractical to apply this
approach to the unique scientific processes that constitute
MRT.72
For example, in Minnesota there exists a statute which
states that when, “with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
biological father of a child thereby conceived,” and that “[t]he
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a married woman other than the
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the biological
father of a child thereby conceived.”73 This statute offers a clear
attempt to address the issue of legal parentage in a case of ART
before it arises.74 However, it falls short of addressing how legal
parentage may ensue when the couple is unmarried, if the couple
makes use of egg donation rather than sperm donation, or,
especially important in the matter of this Note, whether such a
couple utilizes MRT.75
In order to address these shortcomings, states often attempt
to circumvent such problems by interpreting statutes broadly
before applying them to a situation that can, at times, greatly
deviate from their intended meanings.76 For example, the same
Minnesota statute mentioned above has been applied to assess
paternity in a situation where an unwed homosexual couple
wished to conceive a child through surrogacy—an ART situation
that plain language of the statute clearly does not address.77 In
this approach, a court broadened the interpretation of the
statute so as to reach an understanding that—despite the use of
spousal terms—the statute did not require marriage and,
therefore, granted parentage to both the biological father and
the woman who served as both egg donor and surrogate.78
However, the court also applied a narrow construal of the statute

72. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 423–24.
73. MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2016).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1303.
77. A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G, No. A10-443, 2010 WL 4181449, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).
78. See id.
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by declining to attribute parentage to the biological father’s
same-sex partner.79
While this approach seems effective at first glance, different
courts can vary drastically in their interpretations.80 In contrast
to the Minnesota court, the Oregon Court of Appeals in
Shineovich v. Shineovich granted parental rights to a biological
mother’s same-sex partner through the application of an ART
statute similar to that of the previously mentioned Minnesota
statute.81 In acting this way, the Oregon Court of Appeals
claimed that the ruling “advances the legislative objective” set
forth by the statute.82
States have also applied public policy to ART parentage
disputes in order to fill in the gaps left by ART statutes.83 For
example, in Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York Court of
Appeals recognized parentage by a civil union.84 This union gave
rise to a situation where the biological mother’s former partner
also possessed maternal rights over the child.85 However,
approaches based on policy alone provide even less guidance
than state statues and are, therefore, far too inconsistent
between decisions and states so as to provide a solution to
disputes arising from the use of MRT.86 This lack of consistency
can be seen even in the established realm of ART by comparing
the result of Debra H. v. Janice R. with an opinion by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stating that
“‘parenthood by contract’ is not the law of Massachusetts and the
agreement is unenforceable as against public policy.”87
These results sum up the main problems with the
application of state statutes to MRT: the view is premised on the
notion that states have passed relevant ART statutes which
possess the opportunity for further interpretation, and, even if
79. See id.
80. Compare id., with Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct.
App. 2009).
81. See Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 39–40.
82. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40 (referring to the legislative objective as
offering protection for children).
83. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06.
84. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010).
85. Id. at 186.
86. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06; Leiser, supra
note 9, at 424.
87. Compare Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196, with T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d
1244, 1246 (Mass. 2012).
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they have, that such statutes can achieve consistent,
predictable, and intended results.88 Unfortunately, these notions
are inapplicable to MRT, thereby necessitating the creation of a
new applicable rule.
2. Basing the Decision on the Best Interests of the Child
The assignment of legal parentage according to the court’s
opinion of the best interests of the child tends to foster the most
emotional appeal among individuals even though it lacks
specificity.89 Rubano v. DiCenzo exemplified this principle when
the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that a biological
mother’s former same-sex partner also had maternal rights to
the child because, contrary to the biological mother’s wishes, the
partner was deemed a de facto parent.90 The court wished to act
in the child’s best interest because the petitioner had an
established relationship with the child which had been fostered
over a span of years.91
Though basing a decision on the best interests of the child
appeals to many, it falls short from several standpoints. First,
this concept must be approached on a case-by-case basis which
removes the likelihood of attaining consistent, predictable, and
uniform results. These tenets of law matter because, when
present, parties looking to previous results of disputes at the
beginning stages of an ART or MRT process can predict disputes
and plan for them ahead of time.92 If parentage rights are
assessed on a case-by-case basis parties may not be able to
foresee the potential results of the dispute or even what rights
they may have in regards to the child at the outset.93 This
encourages litigation over potentially mutual agreement
through settlement.94

88. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06.
89. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 425; see also Byrn & Giddings, supra note
54, at 1306.
90. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975–76 (R.I. 2000).
91. See id. at 976.
92. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 423 (“Variation in the law . . . establishes
significant uncertainty for intending parents regarding the protection of their
legal parentage rights in the face of changing circumstances, such as divorce or
remarriage.”).
93. Id.
94. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1296–97 (referencing the result
that litigation may be necessary to determine legal parentage).
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Second, and most problematic, this approach necessitates
an extended evidentiary process in order to determine the
subjective best interests of the child. Such assessments could
take a significant amount of time subjecting not only the
parents, but also the child, to an incredibly stressful and
adversarial situation. If such proceedings drag on, the legal
dispute itself could become traumatic for a child and result in a
paradoxical situation where an approach designed to achieve an
outcome best for a child actually creates a situation detrimental
to the child’s health and well-being. In regards to MRT, a bright
line rule would achieve a result in an expedited fashion and may
even prevent legal controversies from arising in the first place
through increased clarity of the resulting parental rights at the
outset of the procedure.
3. Assigning Parental Rights Based on Genetic Relationship
to the Child
Approaching the question of legal parentage by focusing on
the genetic relationship between the child and the individuals in
dispute solves many of the problems faced by the previous
methods, particularly those of efficiency and consistency.95 For
example, in Ohio, the decision reached by the court of Belsito v.
Clark articulated the approach’s analysis well when concluding
that surrogacy was secondary to genetics in its determination as
to which parents had legal rights—providing, ultimately, that
the genetic parents had not waived their rights.96 However, most
courts do not favor this approach for ART because it raises new
problems in that it may not always result in an outcome best for
the well-being of the child due to its lack of policy
consideration.97 For example, it can be easily hypothesized, in
terms of ART, that an intended mother and intended father may
conceive a child where the intended mother bears the child, but,
in doing so, the couple makes use of a donor egg fertilized by the
intended father’s sperm. In such a situation, even if the egg
donor waived her rights and wanted nothing to do with the child,
the birth mother would never be considered a legal parent or, at
the very least, her parentage would be second to the father’s
95. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1994).
96. Id. at 766–67.
97. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 2 (referencing a child with genetic
material from three individuals who, though grateful, wants nothing to do with
the mitochondrial donor).

2018]

ASSESSING PARENTAL RIGHTS

267

rights since bearing the child would be considered secondary to
the genes that the child carries.98 Evidently, this result could
create numerous issues if divorce were ever to ensue.
Admittedly, the above hypothetical would provide less of a
problem when it comes to MRT as it would not exclude any of
the individuals involved in the process since they each
contribute genetic material—the mitochondrial mother would
simply be considered an additional third parent unless she had
waived her rights. Further, this stance would streamline the
process in most situations as the results are clear cut and may
be attained concretely through a DNA test.99 However, this
approach is fundamentally flawed in its assumption that, unless
waived, the mitochondrial mother should have equal rights to
legal parentage just because the child’s genetic makeup reflects
her DNA—especially since the mitochondrial mother’s genetic
material makes up a minute fraction of the child’s overall
DNA.100
4. Assigning Parental Rights Based on the Intent of Potential
Parents
Regarding ART, legal scholars have championed an intentbased test due to its ability to solve many of the problems
inherent in the previous approaches.101 One of the most
historically influential and notable cases, although now
superseded by California statute, which based its determination
of parentage on intent is Johnson v. Calvert.102 The court in this
case, confronted with the issue of gestational surrogacy, stated
that “she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own—is the natural mother under California
law.”103 Since this decision, numerous other courts have

98. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767 (describing that there are instances where
giving birth is “subordinate and secondary to genetics” when assessing
parentage).
99. Id. at 766–67 (describing the relative certainty of DNA tests).
100. See infra Part II.B.
101. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54 (determining that the
intent approach is the most common-sense approach when assessing parentage
in disputes involving ARTs).
102. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2017). See generally Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
103. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
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broadened and applied this interpretation104 to set forth an
understanding that “‘when a child is conceived via ART, the
person(s) that intended to bring the child into the world and
raise the child should be the child’s legal parent(s).”105 The
Supreme Court of Indiana further exemplified the spread of this
approach and its continued use through its decision in Levin v.
Levin by holding that, despite no genetic link to the child, a man
was legally the father of a child after he and the child’s mother
had divorced.106 This was due to the court’s determination that
he had encouraged the artificial insemination and promised to
“become the father of the resulting child and to assume his
support.”107 Evidently, courts have, without much difficulty,
applied the intent test to instances of parentage disputes
involving ART.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the intent test
would be the ideal approach to situations involving MRT.108 A
significant aspect of this argument refers to the similarities
between gamete donation of some forms of ART and MRT.109
However, the intent based approach leaves the door open for
dispute over ambiguity when seemingly donative actions take
place. The issue occurs when lines blur between whether an
individual acts as a “true donor” or an “intentional lender of

104. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1308 (referencing the following
cases: McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480–81 (App. Div. 1994); Goad
v. Arel, No. FA074025574, 2007 WL 4711515, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 24,
2007); Wray v. Samuel, No. FA074024921, 2007 WL 4711519, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2007); Caliendo v. Mariano, No. FA074023465S, 2007 WL
4711520, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2007); Caird v. Lugo, No. FA064017776,
2006 WL 5242383, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); DiComo v. Hopkins,
No. FA054007885S, 2005 WL 6007836, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2005);
Velardo v. Murray, No. 485648, 2004 WL 5506691, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
22, 2004); Friend v. Lugo, No. CV020467901, 2002 WL 34370247, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2002); Hatzopoulos v. Murray, No. FA020460329S, 2002 WL
34370245, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2002); Vogel v. Kirkbride, No. FA 020471850, 2002 WL 34119315, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002)).
105. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 425 (quoting Byrn & Giddings, supra note
54, at 1296 and citing Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 297, 322–25 (1990)).
106. Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. 1994).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Leiser, supra note 9, at 430–31.
109. Id. at 429–31.
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procreative genetic material.”110 The intent test suggests that
when a dispute arises as to whether an individual intended to
become a true donor or an intentional lender of procreative
genetic material, the court should focus on the relationship
between the parties.111 However, the focus on the relationship
between the parties creates inconsistent and even conflicting
results. For example, K.M. v. E.G. offers an instance where a
same-sex couple agreed to have a child. 112 In this agreement,
one provided the egg, and the other bore and gave birth to the
child.113 After the couple broke up, E.G., who gave birth to the
child, attempted to argue that K.M. was a true donor.114 Despite
this argument, the California Supreme Court held that because
K.M. intended to jointly raise the child with E.G. in their home,
K.M’s parental rights should be legally recognized.115 In
contrast, in Leckie & Voorhies the Oregon Court of Appeals
considered a sperm donor to have assumed the role of a true
donor to a lesbian couple even though he had multiple
interactions with the child.116 In his role as a true donor, the
court ruled that he waived his parental rights.117
Another reason mentioned in support of the intent test is
that it would easily fall in line with the general approach taken
towards ART and, thus, would avoid creating a subsect from the
other forms of ART.118 However, this desire does not justify
bending the intent test to fit MRT parentage disputes due to the
drastically different processes that occur between ART egg or
gamete donation and that of MRT. MRT involves a process that
incorporates an intervening event and implicitly makes a true

110. See id. at 428 (“A true donor is someone who contributes his or her
gametes to someone else with no intention of parenting the resulting child,
whereas an intentional lender of procreative genetic material is someone who
contributes his or her gametes for the purpose of having a child whom he or she
intends to parent.”) (citing Black, supra note 13, at 816–17).
111. Id. at 429.
112. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 677.
115. Id. at 682.
116. Leckie & Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522–23 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id.
118. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1297 (stating that, in over
seventy-four percent of cases where there was a parentage dispute involving
ART, the result would have been the same if the courts had applied intent test
instead).
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donor of the mitochondrial mother each time.119 Because ART
and MRT incorporate different scientific procedures that achieve
scientifically different results, MRT necessitates the creation of
a separate rule.120
B. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES SHOULD ADOPT A RULE THAT
THE MITOCHONDRIAL MOTHER HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS
MRT necessitates an alternative approach to legal
parentage compared to those approaches suggested previously.
Courts and legislatures should uniformly adopt a rule that the
mitochondrial mother has no claim over a child conceived
through the use of MRT. Adoption of a bright line rule makes
application easy, simplifies the dispute resolution process,
lowers the possibility for disputes to arise, increases efficiency,
and does not disrupt the previous approaches to ART.121 Organ
donation should provide the framework for such a rule in that
the mitochondrial mother, as a true donor, would have no legal
parentage rights, even if considered an intending parent.122 The
science behind MRT procedures, in both its process and outcome,
logically leads to the adoption of this stance.123
The intent test assumes that the mitochondrial mother has
the potential to assume claim to the child. However, unlike egg,
sperm, or gamete donation, a constructive process takes place
prior to implantation.124 The resultant egg does not contain the
nucleus of the mitochondrial mother’s original egg, but, instead,

119. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the process of
MRT).
120. See infra Part II.B.
121. Britain’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has
already adopted such a bright line rule upon legalizing MRT procedures. Ian
Sample, First UK Baby with DNA from Three People Could Be Born Next Year,
THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/dec
/15/three-parent-embryos-regulator-gives-green-light-to-uk-clinics
(determining that the mitochondrial mother has no parental claim on the
resulting child).
122. Ideally, states could allow for couples to contract, prior to the procedure,
to extend parental rights over the child to the mitochondrial mother. This would
eliminate much of the confusion in later determination. However, the great
majority of states do not support the theory that parental rights can be assigned
by contract alone. See, e.g., T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004).
123. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–26 (explaining the process
and result of MRT).
124. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25.
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that of the nuclear mother.125 The process to achieve such a
result involves intricate scientific procedures and creates what
may be argued to be a new egg in that it possesses a different
structure and genetic material from a combination of the nuclear
and mitochondrial mothers’ eggs.126
Such an application of medical science parallels the
reasoning in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.127
In this case, Moore had certain tissues removed from his body
due to surgery.128 These tissues were then subjected to medical
experiments leading to commercial and scientific enterprises.129
Moore attempted to assert property rights over the researchers’
resulting patent by claiming conversion, but the court denied his
claim.130 A primary reason why the court denied his claim was
the fact that the experiments yielded a cell line that was both
factually and legally distinct from those tissues initially
surrendered.131 Even though such tissues do not provide a
perfect analogy to MRT and reproductive substances, it gives
insight in that both the cell line and the resultant egg from MRT
become distinct from the initial organic substances.132 The eggs
contributed by the mitochondrial mother to MRT, just like
Moore’s tissues, have the potential to become the final product
through the application of an intricate scientific procedure and
do not possess such an ability on their own.133
Opposition to this stance may set forth counterarguments
that such an intervening process could sever the nuclear
mother’s property rights as well. However, this assertion fails
due to the reason as to why the scientific process was done in
125. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25.
126. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25.
127. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
128. See id. at 481.
129. See id. at 481–82.
130. See id. at 497.
131. See id. at 492–93 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–
10 (1980)). The court stated that the cell line was both factually and legally
distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body. Id. Federal law permits the
patenting of organisms that represent the product of ‘human ingenuity,’ but not
naturally occurring organisms. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Dickens, supra
note 57, at 77.
132. Compare Moore, 793 P.2d at 492–93 (holding that the new cell line was
factually distinct from Moore’s original cells), with sources cited supra notes 19–
26 (explaining that the mitochondrial donor’s egg is stripped of its nucleus and
combined with the nuclear mother’s nucleus).
133. See sources cited supra note 132.
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Moore which distinguishes itself from the MRT process. In
Moore, the doctors, as agents of the Regents of the University of
California, developed the tissues into a new substance for their
own gain.134 As such, the Regents of the University of California
and its doctors reaped the benefits from the procedure.135 In the
context of MRT, the doctors are creating the new egg for the
benefit of the nuclear mother, not themselves. Therefore, the
nuclear mother reaps the overall benefit since the doctors act on
her behalf.
As an additional point, the function of the tissues may be
looked at for guidance. In MRT, the nucleus of the nuclear
mother’s egg receives the fraction of mitochondrial DNA which
will help it grow and develop as opposed to the nucleus being
given to the mitochondrial DNA.136 In MRT, doctors destroy the
mitochondrial mother’s healthy egg that possesses all the
potential to function, and take only the mitochondrial DNA.
Thus, one cannot logically say that the procedure is done for the
benefit of the mitochondrial mother’s egg. In essence, the process
of MRT appears to assign priority to the nuclear mother because
the procedure is undergone for her benefit and that of her egg
rather than for the benefit of the doctors handling the procedure,
the mitochondrial mother, or the mitochondrial mother’s egg.137
In addition to the relevance of the decision in Moore, the
mitochondrial mother becomes further removed from the child
when assessing the DNA contributed to the child in detail. For
example, proponents of an intent test may argue that the
amount of DNA should not guide a determination of parental
rights even though the mitochondrial mother adds a virtually
negligible amount of DNA to the child—less than 0.001%.138
However, courts should recognize that this miniscule amount of
DNA provides insight into the intent of the mitochondrial
mother. Donating a certain fraction of DNA suggests that the
134. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481–82.
135. Id. at 481–82.
136. See sources cited supra note 28 (explaining the effect that healthy
mitochondrial DNA has on development as opposed to unhealthy mitochondrial
DNA).
137. See Dickens, supra note 57, at 90 (describing how the medical staff
serves the indented recipient while only having a duty to the donor to their use
or misuse of the material).
138. See Pritchard, supra note 2 (demonstrating that a child with DNA from
three individuals does not want a relationship with the mitochondrial mother
since the amount of DNA is so small).
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mitochondrial mother intends to proceed as a true donor because
of the difference between the DNA in the nucleus and the DNA
in the mitochondria. In MRT, the nucleus of an egg contains the
chromosomes contributed to a child whereas the mitochondrial
DNA only assists in development.139 As such, the resulting child
from MRT will derive its physical appearance and personality
from the nuclear mother and will not bear a resemblance to the
mitochondrial mother.140 This further demonstrates the
destruction of the unique aspects of the mitochondrial mother’s
egg and a severance of connections to the mitochondrial
mother.141
Opponents of this view may argue that, while the
mitochondrial mother contributes only a very little amount of
DNA and such DNA does not guide the development of the
child’s traits, the DNA contributed is no less vital to the
development of the child.142 Therefore, based upon the value of
the contribution, the mitochondrial mother should then have a
claim to parental rights. While true that the child may not
develop naturally without such a donation, this claim is merely
based on the assumption, rather than the guarantee. There
almost always remains a chance in instances of defects in
mitochondrial DNA such as in Leigh Syndrome, regardless of
how slim, that the egg in which the nucleus originally came from
may develop naturally.143 Assigning value based on chance is not
a firm basis for parentage decisions. Furthermore, a parallel
may be drawn to inter vivos kidney donation in that the donee
ends up containing a small amount of the donor’s DNA (located
in the donated organ), and the gift may be considered life
giving.144 In inter vivos donation, any possession of a donated

139. See Pritchard, supra note 2; see also Jessie Szalay, Chromosomes:
Definition & Structure, LIVE SCI. (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:51 PM EST), https://www
.livescience.com/27248-chromosomes.html (explaining that chromosomes are
located within the nucleus of the cell).
140. Kolata, supra note 34 (“The genes for traits that make up a person’s
appearance and other characteristics are carried in the nuclear DNA. If a white
woman got mitochondria from an Asian woman, for example, her babies would
be white, with no traces of the Asian mitochondrial donor.”).
141. See Pritchard, supra note 2; see also Szalay, supra note 139.
142. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 28–31 (listing the detrimental effects
that flawed mitochondrial DNA can cause).
143. See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 4.
144. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 28–31 (listing the detrimental effects
that flawed mitochondrial DNA can cause).
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organ or gift is relinquished upon implementation in a new
individual.145 Here, the egg similarly receives what should be
considered a donation of vital mitochondrial DNA and
intracellular organelles from the mitochondrial mother’s egg.146
Kidney donation helps an individual to function without altering
the individual’s traits, and, likewise, the mitochondrial mother’s
act helps the nuclear mother’s egg to function properly rather
than alter the traits of the egg.147 In the same way that kidney
donors may not leverage their donation to those that possess
their kidneys, the mitochondrial mother should not have the
opportunity to leverage the donation of her mitochondrial DNA
to insert herself as an additional parent.148
A rule that the mitochondrial mother has no claim over a
child conceived through MRT would reduce litigation in that it
requires people to come together prior to the procedure to
understand parentage rather than attempting to make a
retroactive determination once confusion breeds conflict.
Furthermore, even if litigation arises this rule could work easily
with the existing precedent and statutes applied to situations
involving ART. For example, the possibility exists that the
mitochondrial mother, or another individual, could be a
surrogate for the resultant egg. In determining the parentage of
such a situation, the rule argued by this Note would simply

145. E.g., Dickens, supra note 57, at 90 (determining that a person
maintains control over an organ until the designated transplantation takes
place).
146. See sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the MRT procedure).
147. See Pritchard, supra note 2 (stating that the DNA in the nucleus is the
DNA that affects physical and mental traits).
148. Although outside the scope of this Note, it is important to specify that
the stance of this Note does not suggest that there are any problems with
multiparent families. Such familial arrangements are becoming more and more
commonplace given the increased use of ARTs. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 433.
However, the adoption of a rule severing a mitochondrial mother’s parentage is
unlikely to affect multiparent families because MRT should only be used for
medical use necessary to prevent potential mitochondrial defects. Although the
approval of MRT is foreseeable in the United States, the use of MRT for
nonpreventative purposes (for example, if a polyamorous relationship merely
wanted to each contribute genetically to a child) is unlikely to follow even if
multiparent families wanted each member to contribute to a child. MRT is still
experimental and, therefore, the safety of the resulting child is not assured. See
Pritchard, supra note 2 (“The technique itself could allow the child to inherit
untried untested medical complications[.]”). Thus, the use of MRT for the
destruction of two healthy eggs to create one may cause more harm to a
conceived child than simply making use of a single egg.
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preempt the intent test in that that the mitochondrial mother
would not have claim on the child based solely upon her donation
of mitochondrial DNA. After this step, courts could assign
parentage by application of a subsequent intent test to ascertain
what weight should be given to the action of surrogacy. Even
though MRT is a subsect of ART, the utilization of the MRT rule
regarding mitochondrial mothers as true donors does not
complicate future parentage disputes. In the same way that an
individual without any genetic attachment to a child may insert
themselves into a relationship with the child through an intent
test, so too could a mitochondrial mother. The mitochondrial
mother simply would have no additional pull based upon her
actions in the MRT process or the donation of mitochondrial
DNA.
Lastly, the adoption of this Note’s proposed rule combines
all the beneficial pieces of each previously mentioned approach:
this stance takes the bright line rule concept from state statute
application;149 it incorporates public policy in its development;150
it takes into account what is best for the child by increasing
predictability, thereby lowering future litigation over parentage;
the procedure takes a significant amount of time to set up prior
to the conception, thereby implying that the parents are
committed to the child;151 it applies a genetic assessment, but it
does so while taking into account the type and amount of genes
contributed;152 and it takes into account the implied intent of the
parties involved.153 It also allows for the intent test to be applied
to complex situations after MRT parentage disputes are
resolved.154
CONCLUSION
MRT promises to impact the field of ART. Although it still
possesses some ethical and practical concerns,155 the practice of
it now seems medically safe for the first time in history as seen
149. See supra Part II.A.1.
150. See supra Part II.A.1 .
151. See supra Part II.A.2.
152. See supra Part II.A.3.
153. See supra Part II.A.4.
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 2 (stating, among others, concerns over
child health, the possibility of playing God, and that the technique may lead to
designer children).
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by its recent success stories.156 Because there also exists a form
that does not hinge upon the destruction of embryos, the United
States will likely follow Britain’s example and legalize the use of
at least one of its forms in the near future.157 Depending on the
regulations placed on MRT, it may help individuals suffering
from mitochondrial diseases and infertility bear healthy
children, and, therefore, grow rapidly in popularity.158 Given
this likelihood for increased use, MRT will inevitably follow in
the footsteps of other forms of ART and lead to parentage
disputes based on the addition of another parent with a genetic
influence in the resultant child. As such, the legal community
should proactively ready itself for the legal ramifications of such
scientific advancements. This Note concludes that MRT clearly
distinguishes itself from other forms of ART based on the science
behind it, and, therefore, the traditional forms of assigning
parentage in disputes involving ART lack applicability to
situations utilizing MRT. As such, the legal community must
develop a new applicable rule for the subsect MRT.
However, adding the rule for MRT as proposed in this Note,
will not affect the determinations already made in other forms
of ART. This rule should state that the mitochondrial mother, as
a true donor, will have no legal parentage rights and, therefore,
cannot levy the contribution of mitochondrial DNA as grounds
for parentage. In doing so, the approach will reduce future
uncertainty and conflict in an inconsistent area of law.

156. See sources cited supra note 8 (referring to the two most recent healthy
children born through the use of MRT).
157. See Sample, supra note 121.
158. See sources cited supra notes 28–31.

